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The Seventh Ottoman--Venetian War was fought between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire between 1714 and 1718. It was the last conflict between the two powers, and ended with an Ottoman victory and the loss of Venice's major possession in the Greek peninsula, the Peloponnese (Morea). Venice was saved from a greater defeat by the intervention of Austria in 1716. The Austrian victories led to the signing of the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, which ended the war. This war was also called the Second Morean War, the Small War or, in Croatia, the War of Sinj. Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, the Holy League of Linz gathered most European states (except for France, England and the Netherlands) in a common front against the Ottomans. In the resulting Great Turkish War (1684--1699) the Ottoman Empire suffered a number of defeats such as the battles of Mohács and Zenta, and in the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), was forced to cede the bulk of Hungary to the Habsburg Monarchy, Podolia to Poland-Lithuania, while Azov was taken by the Russian Empire. Further south, the Republic of Venice had launched its own attack on the Ottoman Empire, seeking revenge for successive conquests of its overseas empire by the Turks, most recently (1669) the loss of Crete. Venetian troops, under the command of the able general Francesco Morosini (who became Doge of Venice in 1688), were able early in the conflict to seize the island of Cephalonia (Santa Maura) in 1684, the Peloponnese (Morea) peninsula (1685--1687) and parts of Continental Greece, although attempts to conquer Chalkis (Negroponte), recover Crete and hold on to Chios failed. In the Treaty of Karlowitz, Venice gained recognition of its control over Cephalonia and the Morea, and restored the situation in the Aegean to its pre-war status quo, leaving only the island of Tinos in Venetian hands. The Ottomans were from the outset determined to reverse these losses, especially the Morea, from which a large part of the Valide Sultan's (the Ottoman queen-mother) income had come. Already in 1702, there were tensions between the two powers and rumours of war because of the Venetian confiscation of an Ottoman merchant vessel; troops and supplies were moved to the Ottoman provinces adjoining the Venetian “Kingdom of the Morea“. The Venetian position there was weak, with only a few thousand troops in the whole peninsula, plagued by supply, disciplinary and morale problems. Nevertheless, peace was maintained between the two powers for twelve more years. In the meantime, the Ottomans began a reform of their navy, while Venice found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically from the other European powers: the Holy League had fractured after its victory, and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701--1714) and the Great Northern War (1700--1721) preoccupied the attention of most European states. The Ottomans took advantage of the favourable international situation to settle their scores with Russia, inflicting on them a heavy defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1710--1711. This victory encouraged the Ottoman leadership and after the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Adrianople in June 1713, the way was open for an attack on Venice. A pretext was easy to find: the seizure of an Ottoman ship carrying the treasures of the former Grand Vizier, Damad Hasan Pasha, as well as the Venetians' granting of sanctuary to Danilo I, the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, after he had launched an abortive revolt against the Turks. As a result, on 9 December 1714, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Venice. The Ottoman conquest of the Morea During the early months of 1715, they assembled an army of ca. 70,000 men in Macedonia under the Grand Vizier Silahdar Damat Ali Pasha. The Grand Vizier marched south, reaching the main camp in Thebes in early June. In the meantime, the Ottoman Fleet, numbering 80 warships under Canum Hoca, had captured the last Venetian possessions in the Aegean, the islands of Tinos and Aigina. The Venetians, who did not have any standing army and relied mainly on mercenaries, could only muster 8,000 men and 42 mostly small ships, under the command of the Captain General Geronimo Delphino. This force was not only insufficient to meet the Ottoman army in the field, but also inadequate to man the many fortifications that the Venetians had built or enhanced during the past decades. In addition, the local Greek population disliked Venetian rule, something Damad Ali exploited, by ensuring that his troops respected their safety and property. Thus he was able to count on the good will of the Greeks, who provided his troops with ample provisions, while the Venetians, who hoped to recruit a militia amongst the native population, were left isolated in their forts.
